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The chapter looked on the background of the research topic and prevailing factors that triggered the researcher to conduct research on the particular topic.  The chapter guides the researcher to concentrate on the objectives and the significance of the whole study.  It commenced with the background of the research problem which explained what the topic is all about so that the reader could be aware of the topic, then the statement of the problem that guides the researcher.  Moreover the chapter has the objectives of the study, research questions, and significance of the study, scope of the study, and limitation of the study.

1.2	Backgrounds to the Problem
This work examines the legal and practical problems relating to insurance claims and claims settlement in Tanzania. According to Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary,​[1]​
“Insurance is a contract whereby a person (the insurer) agrees in consideration of money paid to him, (the premium), by another person, (the assured), to indemnify the latter against loss resulting to him on the happening of certain events.  Policy is the document which contains the terms of the contract. Insurance is a contract                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        uberrimae fidei  (of the utmost good faith) and of indemnity only, except in the case of life and accident insurance, when an agreed sum is payable’’.
It can be conceived from the preceding observation that, insurance has to do with modern development in the business against risks. Insurance mostly relates to ships, cargo, and buildings (property and fire insurance), death (life insurance), automobile accidents (auto insurance) and the cost of medical treatment (health insurance). The insurance industry has been profitable and has provided attractive employment opportunities for white collar workers (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​White-collar_worker" \o "White-collar worker​).

Insurance helps to avoid risks. For example, fire insurance companies demand safe practices and availability of fire stations and hydrants and measures to avoid spread of risks from an individual or single company to the larger community. Insurance also provides an important source of long-term finance for both public and private sectors. Insurance is also described as a social device whereby a large group of individuals through a system of equitable contribution may reduce or avoid certain measurable risks of economic loss resulting from accidental occurrence of disastrous events.​[2]​ 

The theory behind insurance is that members of the insurance scheme contribute to a central fund from which payments will be made in case one of the contributors suffers the loss he/she is insured against.  The payment of individual contribution is called ‘premium, which means the consideration for the insurance company’s undertaking to pay indemnity in case of the occurrence of the risk insured against.​[3]​ 
The legal basis of any insurance transaction is an insurance contract.  In an insurance contract, as in the other types of commercial contracts, only parties competent to contract may be parties to it.  The relationship begins by one person who is at risk applying to another person to assume that risk. When the contract is finally agreed upon, the applicant becomes the insured.  The person accepting the application is the insurer.  The insurer and insured are, therefore, the parties to an insurance contract.​[4]​ 

The general law governing insurance is the law of Insurance.​[5]​ This law sets out the basic principles and draws almost directly from the English Common Law. According to English Common law, once the formal requirements of offer, acceptance, free consent, capacity and consideration have been met by the parties, the contract is effected.​[6]​ Insurance contracts may, therefore, be formed simply by the satisfaction of the aforestated requireme

However, insurance claims and claims settlement may pose some challenges in terms of non-payments, undue delay, long litigations and negligence in the settlement of insurance claims. Statutory law also plays a significant role in regulating insurance contracts. 

Legislation of this kind not only required that an insurance contract be in writing, but also that such writing be approved by Commissioner before it becomes a contract. Which in my opinion it is costly and time consuming taking into consideration of our country geographical coverage. This legal requirement presupposes a presence of challenges in insurance claims and subsequent settlement of the same. There is thus need to analyze legal and practical problems relating to insurance claims and settlement of the same in order to come up with policy recommendations.

1.3	Statement of the Problem
The law relating to claims and claims settlement is difficult to enforce because of loopholes in the law. For instance, policy provisions may require the insured to give notice of loss as soon as possible, legally interpreted as ‘within reasonable time’, and this becomes a question of fact.​[7]​  In addition to that, in each case, notices of loss are often required to contain full particulars, including detailed circumstances surrounding the loss. The rule of interpretation of after loss clauses is that, if they are not strictly complied with, the insurer will not be liable, since they are conditions precedent to recovery. 

Moreover, in the case of notice of loss, it is assumed that, if the insurer were given immediate notice, it might be possible to mitigate the loss. This argument is fallacious because it erroneously suggests that the insured usually act in a fraudulent manner and ignore the good faith principle, which requires the diligence of one who is self insured.  Furthermore, it is wrongly assumed that insurers have the facilities to prevent further loss which are not available to the insured. ​[8]​ Furthermore; insurers are not always ready and willing to come to the aid of the insured as soon as they are aware of the loss. 

 It should be understood that, it is the insurers who usually device the contracts and they provide that the notice requirement is a condition precedent to their liability. It is equally important to for the law to consider the fact that the insurer may not always act honestly thereby, leading to such challenges as non-payments, undue delay, long litigations and negligence in the settlement of insurance claims. It is against this background that this study sought to investigate legal and practical problems relating to insurance claims and settlement of the same in Tanzania.

1.4	 Research Objective
The researcher was guided by the following general and specific objectives:

1.5	General Objectives
The main objective of the research was to examine the legal and practical 
problems relating to insurance claims and settlement of claims in Tanzania. 

1.5.1	Specific Objectives
Specific objectives of the research included:
i)	To identify gaps in existing Insurance policies and legislations in the settlement of insurance claims in Tanzania.
ii)	To assess implication of the gaps in the Insurance policies and legislations in the settlement of insurance claims in Tanzania.
iii)	Recommend ways of improving the Insurance policies and legislations in the settlement of insurance claims in Tanzania.

1.5.2	Research Questions
The research sought to answer following general and specific questions:
General:  To what extent do the existing Insurance policies and legislations relating to claims and claims settlement favours insurers more than the insured.
i)	Specific:  What are the gaps in the existing Insurance policies and legislations in the settlement of insurance claims in Tanzania?
ii)	What are the implications of the shortcomings in the existing Insurance policies and legislations in the settlement of insurance claims in Tanzania?

1.6	Significance of the Study
Conclusion and recommendation drawn from this study include the following significance;
i)	Analysis of existing Insurance policies and legislations, identification of gaps and advise to the Tanzania Government and Tanzania Insurance Regulatory Authority on better ways to improve the existing Insurance policies and legislations in the settlement of insurance claims in Tanzania.
ii)	Findings to be used as a source of reference by the academicians and general public at large.

1.7	 Scope of the Study
i)	The study covered analysis of existing Insurance policies and legislations in the settlement of insurance claims in Tanzania and how the said Insurance policies and legislations can be improved to protect the insured.  It covered three insurance companies and some individuals as the case study.

1.8	 Limitation of the Study
One of the problems was access to some relevant records, particularly from the insurance companies. For example, it was essentially difficult to obtain data for longstanding unsettled claims. However, the problem was minimized by explaining 
the purpose of the study as well as requesting records that proved to be more relevant to the study. Since some information could also be obtained through the other strategies, namely FGDs and interviews, the information not fully established through documentary search could be supplemented. Another problem was getting all the required FGD participants since they were scattered all around the city while their schedules also varied significantly. This made the researcher to spend more time than expected trying to negotiate the timetable for the participants.  

1.9	Hypothesis 
This study is guided by the hypothesis that, the law relating to claims and claims settlement favours insurers more than the   insured.

1.10	 Conclusion 




















This chapter is a review of the literature related to the present investigation. The aim is to show what previous studies on the issue at hand have found out and to locate gaps that this study may fill and chart out new directions.

2.2 Literature Review
There are various writers who have dealt with claims and claim settlement; According to Mike Adams and Philip Hardwick9 in the insurance industry, claims tend to constitute the major proportion of total annual outgoings across almost all product lines. This study develops a cost function of insurance claims and applies the model to 1988-93 data from the United Kingdom and New Zealand life insurance industries.   This study shows a similar set of results for the two countries. In general, the results support the hypothesis that larger life insurance firms on average face bigger claims-to-premium ratios than smaller life insurance firms. 

 Although evidence concerning the relationships between claims and the composition of output and between claims and the degree of reinsurance is mixed, there is clear a support for the view that stock firms have less severe claims experience than mutual’s. I conclude that the model provides intuitive insights into the determinants of insurance claims, which could help to stimulate and direct further research. The insurance industry internationally currently faces many institutional challenges, ​[9]​including increased competition, greater solvency risk, a changing regulatory environment and high insurance claims.  Indeed, claims constitute a major proportion of the total annual outgoings of insurance firms across almost all product lines.  For example, in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand  life insurance industries in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the claims included all payments to policyholders for mortalities, pension and annuity payments, maturities and surrenders consistently averaged roughly 60 per cent of annual premium income each year-a feature mirrored in other jurisdictions, such as Australia  10. 

Keith and Sharon11 state that, we examine the optimal claims settlement strategy for a liability insurer when claimants can permanently misrepresent their bosses by engaging in costly claims falsification.  In this environment, claims auditing is not a possible deterrent to fraud, and the settlement strategy consists of an indemnification profile that relates the insurance payment to the claimed amount of loss.  The optimal indemnification profile is shown to involve systematic underpayment of claims at the margin as a means to deter loss exaggeration, with the extent of underpayment limited by expected litigation costs and potential bad-faith claims.  

The key testable implication of the theory is that the extent of underpayment should be greater for classes of claims for which loss exaggeration is easier.12 Empirical analysis of insurance settlements for bodily injury liability in automobile accidents confirms this prediction.  This suggests that liability insurers optimally choose claims payment strategies to lessen a claimant’s incentive to exaggerate losses. 

Six months after accidentally setting his house on fire while attempting to remove a beehive, an Indian homeowner was still sleeping in his dining room while awaiting his insurer’s initial settlement offer.13

A Pennsylvania driver whose car was struck from behind three times by a tractor-trailer, which resulted in permanent shoulder injuries that left him unable to put on a shirt without assistance, was offered  $500  by the trucker’s insurance company.14  In Mahnattan, an insurer contested a $1 million claim by an antique dealer involving artwork allegedly stolen from his brother-in-law’s parked. 

This article proves my study on how optimal indemnification profile is shown to involve systematic underpayment of claims at the margin as a means to deter loss exaggeration. This suggests that liability insurers optimally choose claims payment strategies to lessen a claimant’s incentive to exaggerate losses, this particular kind of arrangement favours insurers more than insured.​[10]​

According to Paul Fenn, Stephen Diacon, Alastair Gray, Ron Hodges and Nell Rickman,15 after adjustment for hospital activity, the rate of closed claims increased during the 1990s by about 7 percent per annum, claims were brought against the health authority (from events before restructuring) or the constituent NHS trusts (from events after restructuring).  The data base was established in the early 1980s and has been continuously maintained since then.  Data on each claim are collected from the date of the initial incident, including details of the plaintiff all claim events (disclosure, witness statements, expert reports, etc) and outcomes (payments made, costs incurred).  As of January 1999 the database contained information on 902 active and 1993 closed clinical negligence cases. 

This article suggest that insurers are favoured by governments, after restructuring from Health Authority to NHS Hospitals, the rate of closed claims increased during the 1990s by about 7 percent per annum. This shows clearly that decision made by government of restructuring resulted to 1993 closed clinical negligence cases, this is anomaly and in future such exercise shall be conducted to make sure that the insured’s are not suffering loss.

According to Jean Pinquet, Mercedes Ayuso and Montserrat Guillen16 selection bias results from a discrepancy between the range of estimation of a statistical model and its range of application.  This is the case for fraud risk models, which are estimated on audited claims but applied on incoming claims in the design of auditing strategies.  Now audited claims are a minority within the parent sample since they are chosen after a severe selection performed by claims adjusters.  This article presents a statistical approach that counteracts selection bias without using a random auditing stra​[11]​tegy.  A two-equation model on audit and fraud (a bivariate probit model with censoring) is estimated on a sample of claims where the experts are left free to take the audit decision.17  

In my study I was looking on issues of loopholes on the side of insurers, in this particular case, experts are left free to take the audit decision.  Taking into consideration that audited claims are a minority within the parent sample since they are chosen after a severe selection performed by claims adjusters. Claims adjusters are an employee of insurer therefore he will adjust insurance claims in the interest of insurer and not otherwise.

According to James W. Hughes and Edward A. Snyder18 selection processes that are inherent in litigation complicate policy-oriented research of medical malpractice tort reforms.  With regard to their deterrent impact, the range of potential inferences based on analyses of claim frequency is limited because plaintiffs only file a subset of potential claims.  As for their impact on litigation costs, researchers often analyze data on claim disposition, but it is difficult to determine whether effects attributed to tort reforms reflect changes in litigant behaviour or their influence on the selection of claims.  In this article, they evaluated these problems and report results of the study on the effects of medical malpractice reforms on claim disposition. This article is a continuation of the above article which deals with selection bias, whereby, insurers are favoured basing on their behaviour or influence on the selection of claims. Thus to say they are free to select which claims are benefitable to them. 

According to Richard B. Lillich and David J. Bderman 19  the Foreign claims Settlement Commission (Commission or FCSC) was granted jurisdiction to determine the validity and amounts of certain claims by U.S. nationals against Iran by the Iran claims Act and the 1990 Settlement Agreement (lump sum settlement) between the United States and Iran.  The Iran claims Act, a 1985 statute enacted in anticipation of the lump sum agreement settling U.S. “small claims”3 against Iran, required the Commission to apply:
(1)	the terms of any settlement agreement [lump sum settlement];
(2)	the relevant provisions of the Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria of January 19, 1981 giving consideration to interpretations thereof by the Iran-United State claims Tribunal; and 
(3)	applicable principles of international law, justice, and equity.
 
This article suggests how the Government favours the insured’s by enacting law which clearly granted Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (Commission or FCSC) jurisdiction to determine the validity and amounts of certain claims by U.S. nationals against Iran.​[12]​According to Helen Doerpinghaus, Joan Schmit and Jason Jia-Hsing Yeh20  despite the importance of claims handling practices to consumers and insurers, relatively little research has been done in this area.  Their purpose here was to consider one aspect of automobile bodily injury liability claims management and the assignment of fault across parties as judged by the insured defendant’s claims adjuster.  Because legal fault assessment directly affects whether a defendant is held liable, and if so, for how much.21 This aspect of claims management is significant.  They used accident data from the 1997 insurance Research Council closed claim survey to test for relationships between fault assessment and gender, age, and state comparative negligence rules. 

This article raising doubts that, if legal fault assessment directly affects whether a defendant is held liable, and if so, for how much. Challenges which might occur here is where legal fault assessment directly affects a defendant will him going to win or to lose? And if the case will be decided in his favour how much he will be paid. In view of the above, legal fault assessment favours insurers more than insured.

Paul Fenn and Neil Rickman22 present a version of Spier’s (1992) dynamic model of litigation and use it to derive predictions about the duration of legal claims against motor insurers.  Those predictions are tested against a unique set of case data collected from an English motor insurer.  The main predictions are supported, with one exception.  The authors’ results suggest that information plays a key role in such cases and indicate that insurers may be able to speed cases by taking steps to collect ​[13]​information at early stages in a case.  They also suggest that different forms of plaintiff finance (including insurance) can affect case duration.  Finally, the results suggest a role for signalling models of litigation. Delay in litigation concerns liability insurers for several reasons.  Because it is costly to both sides, it inevitably affects expected claim costs and therefore premiums23. 

Moreover, increased delay typically implies increased uncertainty about the eventual settlement, and there are plausible arguments why insurers may themselves be risk or ambiguity averse. Despite these concerns, little research has been performed on the causes of delay in the settlement of insurance claims.  

The aim of this article is to contribute to such work by testing predictions, derived from a theoretical model, about the factors that might affect the timing of claim disposition.  In particular, the authors are interested in the effect of information asymmetries between insurers and plaintiffs (“third parties” in insurance terminology) on the timing of settlement.  The theoretical analysis of litigation has evolved from an initial stage in which information asymmetries were recognized as being a factor behind the failure to settle, towards an attempt to use the strategic removal of information asymmetries over time as an explanation for delay24.  

This article discuss the issue of delay in the settlement of insurance claims, increased delay typically implies increased uncertainty about the eventual settlement. If there delay in the settlement of claims the most affected persons are insured and not insurers in other words delay in settlement of claims will be detrimental to the insured. 

According to Byamugisha25 claims and claim settlement is affected by complicated notorious exclusion clauses. Indeed, the rule of interpretation of after loss clauses is that if they are not strictly complied with the insurer will not be liable.  These are conditions precedent to recovery. Settlement should be made without undue delay and most insurance companies make this their ordinary practice. 

This book suggest that, the rule of interpretation of after loss clauses is that if they are not strictly complied with the insurer will not be liable, clearly this rule favours insurers more than insured because if they are not complied with the insured will not be paid because these conditions are precedent to recovery. 

2.3 Conclusion




3.0 METHODS AND MATERIALS

3.1 Introduction    
This chapter presents the methods and materials that were used in the present study. In particular, the chapter comprises the research design, description of the area of the study, the sample as well as the techniques used in obtaining the sample. In addition, the chapter also includes the type of data required, the techniques of collecting the data, data management and analysis as well as ethical considerations.

3.2 Description of the Study Area
The research was conducted in Dar es Salaam region where three insurance companies were involved.According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2011), the population of Dar es Salaam was estimated to be 4 million.  The Dar es Salaam city was preferred to other areas in the country due to two factors:  first, the city has the most concentration of insurance companies. Secondly, Dar es Salaam is easily accessible given the available resources. For example, Dar es Salaam was expected to give access to more library resources while also the selected insurance companies have their headquarters in the city. This made it possible to also include potential officials of the companies for interviews. 

3.3 Sample and Sampling Technique
Sampling is a process of selecting individuals from the population in order to be involved in a study.26 in this study, three insurance companies, namely the NIC, Phoenix and Jubilee insurance companies were purposively selected on the basis of their ranking in the date of establishment. It was believed that the long established insurance companies would have more customers (the insured), more claims and thus more experience in handling insurance claims and problems relating to the same. 

3.4 Sampling Procedure
Customer (insured) registers containing the names of customers in each of the three insurance companies were used to select participants in the Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Names of the customers were then used to approach customers purposively to ensure that, the selected sample reflected a true representation of the studied population. After that, individuals were  purposively selected to direct the researcher to customers who had ever claimed their insurance for whatever reasons. It was thus thought that only those who had ever claimed insurance would be able to reflect legal and practical problems relating to insurance claims and subsequent settlement of the same.  

In each insurance company, one official (representing the insurer) were purposively selected and 10 customers (representing the insured) were purposively selected to make the total of 30 customers and three officials. ​[14]​

Therefore, the total sample for this study was 10 customers (the insured) x 3 insurance companies + 3 officials = 33 respondents. The distribution of the respondents is as shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Distribution of the Respondents





Source: Field Data (2012)

3.5 Data and Data Collection Techniques
Moser and Kalton27 argue that the most desirable approach with regard to the selection of appropriate technique for data collection depends on the nature of the particular problem, the time and resources available along with the desired degree of accuracy. The choice of data collection techniques in this study was determined by the guiding research hypothesis. In this regard, both primary and secondary sources of data were required and thus the techniques used had to follow suit.  

3.6 Primary Data Collection
Primary data is directly gathered from respondents. In this study primary data was collected through interviews and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). The strategies are detailed in the following sub-sections.
​[15]​
3.7 Key Informant Interviews 
Key informants interview involved interviewing three insurance companies representing NIC, Phoenix and Jubilee insurance companies. The officials were considered to be informed and knowledgeable on the bases of their designations in the respective companies. Senyagwa28  recommended key informants interview as a research technique used especially when there is a need of understanding people’s underlying motivation, attitudes and documenting reasons for their actions and understanding of issues. Issues discussed generally included views regarding insurance laws, practical adherence to insurance laws as well as problems encountered in settling insurance claims.

3.8 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
Focus group discussion (FGD) is a quicker and cheaper method (Mikkelsen29). A group of 10 customers (insured) from each of the three insurance companies were involved in the discussion at different times and places. In this context, three FGDs were conducted, one for each insurance company guided by a checklist of questions/topics of interest specifically, number of claims, number of claims paid, number of outstanding claims and number of   repudiated claims.  The discussion provided in-depth information that also complemented interviews and documentary search.
​[16]​
3.9 Secondary Data Collection Methods
Secondary data comprises information that has been already collected by someone else. In particular, gathering secondary data involves the collection and analysis of published material, and information from internal sources.  

29. Mikkelsen, B. Methods for Development Work and Research: A Guide for
Practitioners, London: Sage Publications 1995. In this study, secondary data collection included scrutiny of different documentation relating to  insurance claims and claims settlement as well as claims and settlement records for the involved insurance companies.  Documentary search was conducted in the following areas: High Court of Tanzania Library, Court of Appeal Library, University of Dar-es-Salaam library and Open University of Tanzania Library. Further search included different policies and records at the NIC, Phoenix and Jubilee insurance companies. 

3.10 Ethical Considerations
Before conducting this study, the researcher adhered to research ethical issues and procedures to complete the study. First, research clearance letters were obtained from the Open University of Tanzania. The letters were addressed to the respective insurance companies’ headquarters. It is only after obtaining the permission, that this study was conducted. Similarly, participants in the FDGs were consulted and consented to participate and given time to plan for participation prior to meetings. Time and place were also collectively agreed upon by the participants. In all cases, Kiswahili and English were conveniently used as media of discussion and interchange. 

3.11 Conclusion 




4.0 DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction
This chapter is about data presentation, analysis and discussion. The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section presents the profiles of the insurance companies involved. The profiles cover such information as the date of establishment, the range of insurance services and records of claims and claims settlement based on motor and life insurances. The second section presents findings and discussion on the legal problems relating to insurance claims and claims settlement. The third section presents findings and discussion relating to practical problems in insurance claims and claims settlement.  It is worth noting that the contents of this chapter revolve around the guiding research hypothesis that, ‘insurance laws favour insurers more than the insured’.

4.2 Profiles of the Insurance Companies  
In this section the profiles of the three insurance companies involved in the study are presented. The companies covered are the National Insurance Corporation, Phoenix and Jubilee insurance companies. 

4.2.1 The National Insurance Corporation 
Documentary search and interview with the NIC Public Relations Officer (PRO) showed that, the National Insurance Corporation (NIC) was formed and incorporated on 16th October 1963. The Government contributed 51% of its share capital, while the rest (49%) was contributed by various local and overseas private investors. The PRO informed the researcher that the corporation offers a wide range of insurance, including fire insurance, marine and aviation insurance, life insurance and motor insurance. Motor and life insurances are used for the purpose of the present analysis due to the fact the two policies were having enough data compared to the rest also it covers for many years.

Table 4.1 Life Insurance Claims and Claims settlement from 2001 to 2010
Year	No. of claims	Amount paid in Tshs	0utstanding Amount in Tshs	No. of   Repudiated claims
2001	Nil	Nil	6,930,233,750	Nil










Source: National Insurance Company (June. 2010)

The findings presented in Table 4.1 show that, in the covered period, the NIC experienced some problems in the settlement of claims, especially for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 2005, and 2009 where there were no claims paid. The findings show also that, the total amount paid was Tshs 24,323,295= out of Tshs 104,953,004, 543 outstanding amount.  On the other hand, the repudiated claims were two. These claims were repudiated due to early claims and where the proximate cause of death was HIV. Here, utmost good faith principle applied to the extent that the insured did not disclose their HIV status at material time of entering into the life insurance contract. 

Two issues come out clearly; first, although the contract requires the insured to contribute to the insurance company (the insurer), the insurer has the obligation to settle insurance claims as required. However, it has been seen in the finding that the NIC failed to settle some insurance claims; which means that the insured in question could not be paid, and there no clear indication of the measures in place that the insured could take in such a situation. This means that, even if the law could have provisions that bind the insurer to comply with the contract, there are obviously practical problems in effecting compliance on the side of the insurer.

The second issue is that, the two repudiated cases are not clearly accounted for. For instance, the insured could not have been aware of their HIV status prior to the insurance contract. One wonders how the insurer could benefit from the insured’s contribution, despite being HIV positive, but when it comes to paying premiums the law denies the payment on the same basis that allowed the insured to contribute. It would be wiser then for the law to demand the insured to test their health status before the contract is agreed upon. 

The health status certificate from a specified medical practitioner could solve the question of health status as a barrier to claim settlement. It should be understood that not all HIV positive individuals are aware of their status while more and more get infected daily. 
Furthermore, logically people with health problems would require even more comprehensive insurance coverage than would healthy individuals. The law exempting individuals with health problems from insurance coverage, therefore, favours insurers more than the insured as it ensures that the insurer is not required to accept claims within short time to allow the same to amass more and more contributions from the insured. On the other hand, the insured has to contribute to the insurer long enough before they could claim the premium. Cases of non payments were also observed with regard to motor insurance claims as evident in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2: Motor Insurance Claims







Source: National Insurance Company (June, 2010)

The findings presented above show that, the total number of claims was 506 and the total number of claims paid was 169, which is equivalent to 33.4% while percentage of outstanding and repudiated claims was 60.9% and 5.7% respectively. It should be recalled that, motor insurance policy is mandatory, according to the Road Traffic Act, Chapter 168 and Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. Chapter 169. While the law requires every motor vehicle owner to insure the vehicle, it takes it for granted that the insurer will always be honest enough to comply with contract. Instead, it imposes the requirement that, any person who contravenes this mandatory requirement, he will be punished accordingly. One sees clearly that, insurers are favoured at the expense of the insured.

4.2.2 Phoenix Insurance Company
The document reviewed and interviews with the firm’s PRO showed that Phoenix Insurance Company started operating in 1999. The company covers fourteen types of insurance policies, which include, among others, aviation insurance, marine insurance, fire domestic insurance, fire industry insurance, motor private insurance and motor communication insurance. Others are engineering insurance, public liability insurance,    personal accident insurance, theft insurance, workmen’s compensation insurance and fire and engineering insurance. Table 4.3 shows statistics relating to motor insurance claims and settlement in the period extending from 1999 to 2004.

Table 4.3: Motor Insurance Claims and Settlement from 1999 to 2004








Source: Phoenix Insurance Company (July, 2010)

The statistics presented in Table 4.3 suggest that, there was tremendous performance in claims settlement, especially for the years 2001, 2002 2003 and 2004, during which the total claims paid was Tshs. 1,505, 950.000/= . Two reasons could be behind the high rate of compliance; one is that motor insurance policy is mandatory according to the Road Traffic Act. Chapter 168 and Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. Chapter 169. For that case, the company could easily settle such small amounts of claims, in addition to meeting other administrative and operation costs. Practically, it would not be possible for the company to comply, had it not satisfied it’s administrative and operation costs. A slightly different scenario is noted in theft insurance claims and settlement of the same (see Table 4.4 below).

Table 4.4: Theft Insurance Claims and Claims Settlement







Source: Phoenix Insurance Company (July.2010)

In Table 4.4 above, theft insurance claims have been covered for the period of five years, starting from 1999/2000 to 2004. It can be discerned that, although there was good performance on this particular kind of policy, there is a significant discrepancy between claims and settlement of the same. One sees that, while the total claims paid amounted to Tshs. 50,698/=, the outstanding claims amounted to Tshs. 75,122/=. In addition to that, the repudiated cases for the covered period were 11. An interview with the firm’s PRO showed that, the unsettled cases had some legal and procedural problems that needed to be cleared before settlement could be effected. She completely ruled out the possibility that the company had some financial problems that might have been behind the unsettled cases. As for the repudiated cases, the PRO said that the concerned insured had breached some legal and procedural pre-requisites which she, however, did not disclose. Based on this truth, it is clear that laws relating to theft insurance claims and settlement of claims could be even more complex than laws relating to other policies presented earlier.                       	

4.2.3 Jubilee Insurance Company
Jubilee Insurance Company started operating in 2001. Documentary review and the interview with the firm’s Marketing Officer (MO) showed that, the company covers five insurance policies that include motor insurance, fire insurance, accident insurance, marine insurance and life insurance. Motor and accident insurances are used for the present analysis. Table 4.5 presents the statistics pertaining to motor insurance claims and claims settlement. 

Table 4.5: Motor Insurance Claims and Claims Settlement 





Source:  Jubilee Insurance Company (August.2010)

Table 4.5 above shows motor insurance claims and claims settlement from 2001 to 2003. It is seen that there were more claims unpaid than paid. Specifically, the settled claims amounted to Tshs. 1,253,156/=, while the outstanding claims amounted to Tshs. 1,698,480/=. Similarly, there were 13 cases of repudiation. An interview with the company’s MO confirmed that financial difficulties were among the factors that made some claims to remain unsettled. Given the fact that motor vehicle insurance is mandatory, one would expect that the company could have more financial capabilities to settlement insurance claims. An interview with the firm’s MO indicated that the company was still young and that it had not been able to attract a substantial number of customers. However, he also agreed that there were also some legal and procedural problems that delayed claims settlement. The same trend was also seen in accident insurance claims and claims settlement (See Table 4.6 below).

Table 4.6: Accident Insurance Claims and Claims Settlement 





Source:  Jubilee Insurance Company (August.2010)

The data in Table 4.6 above covers the period of three years, starting from 2001 to 2003. In this period, a total number of claims paid stood at Tshs. 184,897/= while the outstanding stood at 318,394/=. This suggests that there were more claims unsettled than settled. The explanations behind this discrepancy were almost similar to those presented earlier by the company’s MO.

 4.3 Legal Problems
This study was carried out in order to investigate legal and practical problems 
relating to claims and claims settlement in Tanzania. In the preceding subsections, we have presented the profiles of the insurance companies covered in this investigation. We now turn to the legal aspect of this investigation. In the subsequent subsections, therefore, I will present the findings based on documentary review, interview and focus group discussion. 

4.3.1 Breaches of Policy Conditions       
Documentary review of Motor Insurance claims by NIC indicated that, 5.7% of the repudiated claims were due to the breach of policy conditions. For example, some incidences were not reported on time. The law required the insured to report by writing or calling to the insurer. Normally, for all kinds of insurance, notice is required within 14 day while for motor insurance a 48 hour notice is required.​[17]​ Notices of loss are often required to contain full particulars in terms of detailed circumstances surrounding the loss. The rule of interpretation of after loss clauses is that, if they are not strictly complied with, the insurer will not be liable. 

In Pioneer General Associate Soc. Ltd v. Mukasa,30 the appellant company by its defence claimed to be under no liability by reason of an alleged breach of a condition of the policy committed by the respondent. This was his failure to report the occurrence of the accident in writing and as soon as possible as stipulated in conditions 2 and 4 of the insurance policy. Condition 10 further stipulated that due observance of the terms of the policy should be conditions precedent to any liability on the part of the appellant company. 
When asked their views regarding the ‘after loss clause’ that required the insured to report incidence within ‘reasonable time,’ 83.3% of the respondents in the FGD claimed that, this requirement did not consider the interest of the insured since the time frame may not always be met by all individuals around the country. For example, 66.5% of the respondents said that communication of incidences could be limited by availability of communication infrastructure. 

Some respondents demanded that the requirement could simply be justification of occurrence of incidences certified by concerned authorities like police and local administration. Table 4.7 below shows the different reasons given by the respondents in favour of the hypothesis that ‘the law relating to claims and claims settlement favours insurers more than the insured’. 	

Table 4.7: Limitations of ‘After Loss Clause’
Reason 	No. of respondents	Responses in %
Communication problems 	25	66.5
Delayed knowledge of occurrence of incidences 	15	50
Insured could falsify notices	12	40
Ignorance of the requirement 	10	33.3
Source: Field Data 2012

As pointed out earlier, most respondents (66.5%) were of the view that, it is not always possible to report incidences within the specified time. As one of the participants in the FGD commented; ‘Take for example the case of motor insurance. The policy requires the insured to report incidences within 48 hours. I remember one day I was involved in an accident in a remote and mountains area of Makete District and taken to hospital unconsciously. It took two days for me to reach the hospital while also the motor vehicle and my other belongings were terribly vandalized. Now tell me, who could report the incidence. You see, only the police are easily accessible since good Samaritans are always there to help. I think this policy is not in our favour’. 

In the views of the respondent above, the insurer could rely on police report to accept or turn down insurance claims. Reacting to this view in an interview, the Jubilee insurance MO accepted that insurance laws are always in favour of the insurers adding that, ‘no one establishes a business expecting to lose. A good business should be able to foresee what might limit their profits and set strategies to handle the situations’. A cross interview with the Phoenix PRO confirmed the same views as he added that insurance is not a service but business. On the other hand, the NIC PRO claimed that, most people think that insurance is a lucrative business since not all insured should claim their insurance. As seen earlier, insurance business dates back to the medieval period while its development is characterized by exploitative modes of production. 

The second concern of the respondents in the FGD is that the insured may not always be aware that there has been an incidence. The participants who raised this point contended that someone else could be involved in an accident, for example. Furthermore, the owner might be away and so not aware of the incident. In case the owner learns of the incidence belatedly, the same cannot claim insurance for a very simple reason; that he was late to report the incident. As seen in Table 4.7 above, 50% of the participants supported the conclusion that based on the fact presented; the laws regarding insurance claims and claims settlement favour the insurer at the expense of the insured. The FGD also revealed that, it was possible for insurers to abuse the provisions of the ‘after loss clause’ by pretending that the insured did not report the incident early enough. This concern received the support of 40% of the participants. The major contention with regard to this concern pertained to the fact that, since the insurer has an upper hand in decision making, dishonest insurers may take advantage of the clause to deny or delay claims for some reasons. 

As advanced in the problem statement, notice of loss requirement erroneously presumes that the insured usually act in a fraudulent manner and ignore the good faith principle. Based on the view raised above, the participants tended to look at the other side of the coin; that the insured may also act dishonestly. Clearly this suggests that the requirement acts in favour of the insurer since the possibility of dishonesty is partially assumed on the insured. 

4.3.2	Breaches of Duty of Disclosure
It is provided that, an insurance contract is a contract of utmost good faith that renders the insured always unable to prove a case against the insurer, if he fails to exercise the highest duty of honesty. Thus, in order to be on the safe side, the insured would be well advised to disclose all material facts as would enable a prudent and reasonable insurer to reject the proposal or charge a proportionate premium that reflects the nature of the risk to be covered (own emphasis). That is to say, an insured who withholds any information which would be necessary in order to accept or reject a proposal would be to the benefit of the insurer. We can see here that, the same reasons were given to the repudiated claims especially to life insurance claims (see particularly Table 4.1 and 4.4).
 
Similarly, an insurer would be entitled to avoid a contract, if the insured has failed to communicate to him any changes related to the contract. The changes may occur before or after the acceptance of the proposal. In any case it does not matter whether the change takes place after or before the acceptance of the said proposal. In the case of Cabaret Club and Casino v. London Assurance,31 A and his wife were the proprietors of a cabaret club which was insured against loss or damage by fire by the defendants. A fire occurred and a claim for £ 27024 was made against the defendants. They contended that the policy should be avoided on the ground that, among others, A had not disclosed that he had been convicted of handling the stolen goods.	

It was held by the Court that, since A had committed a criminal offence, this was material to the contract of insurance and the duty to disclose imposed by the Marine Insurance Act 1906 applied to non - maritime   as well as maritime insurance. Judgement was given for the defendants. 

In another case of Woolcot V. Sun Alliance and London Insurance,32  the plaintiff was granted a mortgage by a building society and the application form which the plaintiff completed said that the society would insure the property.
_________________________________
31.  [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 169
32. [1978] 1 ALL R. 125
No information was required to be supplied by the plaintiff for the purpose of the insurance which was arranged under a block policy held by the society with the defendants. Later, the property was destroyed by fire and the insurance company managed to avoid the policy on the basis that the plaintiff had not disclosed the fact that he had been convicted of the offence of robbery some years previously for which he had been sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. 

It was held in the high court that the non disclosure was a material non disclosure of the facts which a reasonable or prudent insurer might have treated as material and accordingly that the policy was avoided. 

 In the East African case of Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd. v. John Sematengo,33 Sir Udo Udoma thought that the giving of false answers was a non disclosure. In all types of insurance policies, where the insured fail to give genuine information or disclose material information, the insurer divides to share the loss with the insured. In case of life insurance, where death occurred within three years either by committing suicide or due to HIV/AIDS, pressure or diabetes, and not disclosed to the insurer, the insurer decide to refund the insured premier (Own emphasis). 

We see that, the insurer only decides to refund the insured, which means that the insurer is not bound by law. It must be recalled that, insurance laws requires the insured not to withhold any information failure to which it constitutes an offense, and this gives the insurer an advantage over the insured.
_______________________________
33.	Legislative Council Proceedings, 24th session, 5th meeting, 1945.
During the FGD with the participants in this study, different reasons were given as to why the provision regarding disclosure of information works in favour of insurers. The reasons are presented in Table 4.8 below.

Table 4.8: Argument against Disclosure of Information  
Argument 	No. of respondents	% of responses
Lack of awareness 	24	85
Change of health status	20	66.7
Second hand information 	11	36.7
Need for protection 	5	16.7
Source: Field Data, 2012

It was seen earlier that, the insured may not always be aware that an incidence as occurred and so they are required to report to the insurer. This argument kept recurring in all the topics of discussion in the FGD. As seen in Table 4.8, some 85% of the respondents had the same concern. Another 66.7% of the respondents demanded that, for the case of illness, one may have health status changed after the contract and then lose their right of insurance coverage. 

Some 36.7% of the respondents in the FGD argued that, the insured may not always witness the incidence, although he is the one who has to report the incidence to the insurer. In that case, the insured has to rely on information from some other sources who witnessed the incidence. This may make the insured to miss some information or guess the same, only to be learnt later that the information was not correct. Consequently, the insured lacks grounds for insurance claims. It was also noted that 16.7% of the respondents were also of the concern that people with health problems need insurance coverage the most. For that case, any insurance law that exempt people by virtue of their poor health or condition, definitely favour the insurer at the expense of the insured.  

4.3.3	Contract with More than one Insurer
With the coming of trade liberalization, insurance business in Tanzania has been undertaken by eleven insurance companies. An interview with the Jubilee insurance MO showed that, by having more insurance companies in operation, there is a tendency for some people to enter into insurance contract with more than one insurance company so that they can benefit when the loss or damage occurs by claiming from those companies.

An interview with the NIC PRO on the same subject revealed that such cases were quite rampant. This attracted the interest of the researcher and he wanted to find out how the insurance laws handle such breaches. Coincidentally, the NIC experienced two such cases involving motor insurance claims. The claims were brought and found to have been insured by more than one insurance company. In this case, the NIC followed what they termed ‘the principle of contribution’.  Accordingly, if one is insured with 2 insurance companies at a value of 1,000,000/=, on the occurrence of loss or damage, each company will contribute 500,000/= to make up 1,000,000/=,. This is in order not to abuse the principle of indemnity (own emphasis). 

Clearly, here we see that, although the insured contributed to different insurance companies on separate terms, what he/she receives as premium is halved, and this definitely benefits the insurer. One sees that, the insurers could not be affected in any way, if both were to indemnify the insured because to the insurers, the payment constitutes the normal course of events; that the insurers at different times were prepared to indemnify the insured upon occurrence incidence.

4.3.4	Time of Settlement of Claims
Through documentary review and analysis, the researcher found that, the time limit for payment of claims is provided by section 131 of the Insurance Act. 34 That; 
1)	Every insurer shall pay claims within forty five days of the date of receipt of the executed discharge and where the insurer is unable to settle claims within that time, he may apply to the commissioner for extensions of time and the commissioner may grant an extra time of not more than forty five days within which the claims shall be settled.
2)	Where an insurer fails without reasonable cause to settle the claims within forty five days or within the time extended by the commissioner, the claims shall be treated as a bad faith claims against the insurer.
3)	For the purpose of this section “a bad faith claims” means
(a)	An insurer’s delay in the processing of a legitimate claim beyond a time period consistent with normal industry practice. Or
(b)	An insurer’s delay in making payment to a claim beyond forty five days of the date of receipt of the executed discharge without consent of the commissioner.
(c)    The provision of section 166 shall apply to an insurer who engages in a bad faith claims.
Furthermore S.16635 states that: 
___________________________
34. Act. No. 10 of 2009 
35.  Ibid 
1)	Every person who acts in contravention of any of the provision of this Act commits an offence and shall, where no punishment has been stipulated by any other section in this Act for that offence, on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding five million shillings.
2)	Where an offence to which this section applies is committed by a body of persons, every director, manager, controller and principal officer of the company and every partner, manager or principle officer of the partnership shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence.
3)	Notwithstanding subsection (2) where the individual concerned can prove to satisfaction of the commissioner that he was not aware of the act or default which contravened the provisions of this  Act and could not with reasonable diligence have become aware of it, shall not be deemed guilty under this section.

 It has been evident that, the insurer is protected by S.166 (2) which states: Where the offence is committed by a body of persons, every director, manager, controller and principal officer of the company, (company here means artificial persons) shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence. 

However, this sub-section (2) of S.166 is silent on the punishment; that is, no punishment shall be given to the Company’s Director, Manager, Controller or principle officer. The law says they shall only be deemed to be guilty of the offence.  In other words, they shall not be punished.

Furthermore, according to S.166(3) the individual concerned can prove to the satisfaction of the commissioner, that he  was not  aware of the act  or default and could not, with reasonable diligence, have become  aware  of it, he shall not be deemed guilty under this section. Once again, this is a loophole where the law gives very big power to the commissioner to exempt the insurer from been liable to pay the insurance claims by proving to the commissioner that he was not aware of the act or default. Here the question is how we can measure the degree of satisfaction. In other words, how “satisfactory is satisfaction’’ of the commissioner to prove that the insurer was not aware of the act or default. This should be seen as an anomaly and needs some amendment, if the interests of the insured should also be ensured. 

As regards extension of time, this section clearly gives loophole to the insurance company to extend the time by applying for permission to the commissioner, since it is likely to cause delays in the settlement of claims. If time for claims will be allowed to be extended as provided in section 131, there will be delays in their settlement and this is contrary to the intention of parliament, which aimed at settlement of claims within forty five days.  The parliament may wish to amend section 131 so as to state clearly that the payments shall be settled within forty five days without further extension by the commissioner. In the subsection that follows, practical problems relating to insurance claims and claims settlement are examined. 

4.4	Practical Problems
It has been evident in the preceding presentations that laws relating to insurance claims and claims settlement are not always adhered to. The evidence has been that even though laws are known, there have been instances of breaches leading to delays, non-payments and long litigations. This suggests that there are practical and, perhaps procedural problems associated with claims and claims settlement. This section is devoted to the examination of practical and procedural problems in insurance claims and settlement of the same. In that regard, most information was obtained through interviews with the officials representative of the involved insurance companies. They included PROs of the NIC and Phoenix as well as the Jubilee MO and lastly case laws was discussed concerning the matter under research.

4.3.5	Fake Insurance/Breach of Utmost Good Faith
It was discovered earlier that, most motor insurance claims had not been paid and some of them were repudiated. The interview with the three company officials revealed that, after occurrence of an accident, some of the claimants updated the insurance to match with the date of accident. This happened when, for example, before the occurrence of the accident the car owner was not having the insurance policy, but soon after the accident the car owner applied for and was given an insurance cover. In this case, the insured cannot claim any premium since this is against the contract and general insurance requirements. 

4.3.6	Collusion
An interview with the Phoenix PRO indicated that, for all the eleven (11) theft insurance claims repudiated (see Table 4.4), the motive was collusion between thieves and some members of the families. Most of this was achieved exposing their properties to thieves or by providing them with necessary information concerning the properties intended to be stolen. After investigation, it was proved that there was collusion  in  the  burglary  offence  between  thieves  and members of the family 
claiming to be indemnified, and so the insurance company repudiated the claims. 

4.3.7	Accidental Fire
There had been two claims for fire insurance which had been repudiated by the NIC. The researcher sought explanations from the PRO and discovered that, the fires were caused by electricity fault. The claims were thus repudiated on the ground that, whenever there is electrical fault, TANESCO should be liable and not NIC or any other insurance company. One may wish to know the boundary between TANESCO and insurance companies’ liability, and what it means by electrical fault as compared to fire accident per se. 

4.3.8	Corruption
Corruption played a significant part in increasing the problem of claims settlement particularly in Dar es Salaam region. This was established through the FDG whereby some 10 claimants, formerly government employees had had their life insurance with the NIC matured eight to ten years back, but no payments had been made.  They complained that these were clear indicators of corruption. When asked to explain why they thought there was corruption, the respondents said that at the NIC headquarters there is bureaucracy which suggests corruption in that, if one wants their claims to be effected promptly, one must commit some percent of the total claims to insurance officers. 

However, the PRO claimed that there were both financial and technical issues that delayed the payments. He added that the NIC had not been financially well for a decade. 
4.3.9	Agency
It was learnt through the interviews with the insurance companies’ officials that insurance companies transact much of their business through agents, many of whom not their employees.  However, the three insurance companies representatives agreed that there were some risks for both the insurer and the insured, since the agents may not always be honest.  For example, in their efforts to win commissions, some insurance agents fail to live up to what is commendable.  Specifically, they may push people into insurances without fully advising them of their rights and obligations. The situation was said to be worse for potential insured that are no competent in the English language; the agents have to fill in the insurance forms on their behalf.

Asked to explain how they handle such cases, the Jubilee MO contended that ‘courts in East Africa have taken the English view, that when an insurance agent under takes to fill in a proposal form for an applicant, he does so as agent, not of the insurer, but of the applicant’.36 

Based on this legal provision, one logically sees that, since the insurance companies select their agents, the responsibility should be imposed on them to bear the risk of hiring agents so that they pay for any damage caused to applicants by the failure of the agents.  This also justify our hypothesis that, laws relating to insurance claims and claims settlement favour the insurers more than the insured. In a normal course of events, insurance agents should always be the agents of insurance companies. 
__________________________________________________
36. Illiterates Protection Act [1964] Chapter 73
Moreover, since agents are criminally liable for failing to fill in proposal forms correctly,37 civil proceedings may be brought against them to recover damage caused as a result of their default.  

Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd. John Sematengo [1965] E.A 233 
In the case of Marine Ingrid Winther v. Arbon Langrish and southern Ltd,38  the Kenya High court held that an insurance broker was under a duty independent of contract, to review an insurance policy and he was answerable for any damage resulting from the failure of its discharge.  The court arrived at this conclusion by arguing that,
 ‘it is manifested that the defendant, as an insurance broker, and Mr. Cow meadow, the Manager of its Nairobi branch, each constituted a person possessed of special skill and experience in the matter of aircraft insurance that, in all their dealings in this matter, they must be assumed to have undertaken to apply that skill and experience for the benefit of the plaintiff’.

In these circumstances, the relationship which existed between the defendant and the owners attracted the application of the principle in Hedley Byrne's case and that, independent of contract, a duty of care arose.39
Although brokers are regarded by common law as agents of the insured and not of the insurer, this rule of the Kenya court sufficiently illustrates the extent of the duty cast on an agent when he constitutes himself agent of the applicants. 
__________________________________________________
37. The motor union Insurance Co. Ltd. v. A.K. Ddamba [1963]
38. [1966] E.A. 292 (Ken
39 Headley Byrne Co. Ltd. v. Heller and Partners, Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465 	[1963] 2 All E.R. 575
However, the trouble is that many insurance agents will not be able to pay damage awards entered against them. Because of this, a law binding all insurance brokers and agents to take out liability insurance would be a method of alleviating some of the uncollectible losses which applicants suffer at the hands of dishonest agents. 

4.3.10	Interpretation of Policy Clauses
 Insurance companies draft policy and give themselves a minimum of performance duties.40 The general performance duties are to indemnify and to sue or defend suit on the insured's behalf. These matters arise out of contractual provisions and their legal effect generally depends on the interpretation of policy clauses in each individual case. In principle, all policies promise to indemnify the insured at maturity. Policies mature by the occurrence of the insured event.  With the exception of quasi-investment policies, the insured is entitled to no more than his actual loss or damage.41 Could be that, it is the insurer, but guided by policy provisions agreed upon jointly by the two parties in the contract. 
This means that, it requires high degree of honesty and diligence on the part of the insurer to concede that the insured has satisfied conditions subject to the settlement of his/her claims. Definitely, the insured depends on the mercy of the insurer. 

However, the duty to indemnify is subject to the insured’s observance of the terms of the policy. Automatically here the insured has some obligations before indemnity is finally  executed  by  the insurer.  In  other  words,  the  insured  may,  in  some
______________________________
40.	Life Insurance Corporation of India v Valji .  (1968) E.A 225 C.A
41.	Ibid. 

circumstances, lose rights by virtue or claim of not satisfying relevant policy requirements. 
.
The question here is who determines that the insured has satisfied the conditions. 
On the other hand, policy requires the insurance company to settle the insured’s claim immediately,42 failure to which constitutes a breach of contract, in which case the insured will be entitled to the damages arising from the company’s wrongful with-holding of his indemnity.

Settlement is determined at a monetary value and, in many cases, money is paid.  However, the company may choose to repair or re-instate, if it has reserved for itself this right under the contract. Where the company so decides, it appoints an agent to do the re-instatement or repair on its behalf it will be liable for defaults.43  

It should be clear that, the repair or re-instatement should restore the damaged article to its condition before the incidence. It is seen here that, it is the insurer who makes decisions as to give out money or repair a damaged article, which suggests that, the insured has no place in this case.  Usually, policies reserve to the company the right to take over legal proceedings related to the insurance and, if it has already paid the indemnity or is liable to do so, to sue in its own right any third party who is liable for the loss.
______________________________
42. Life Insurance Corporation of India v Valji .  (1968) E.A 225 C.A
43.   John Kakonge v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. [1965] E.A 37 E.A 
In either case, the company has to sue in the name and on behalf of the insured, since even after it has indemnified him and subrogation applies, the right to sue will remain in the insured44​[18]​.  

The company also reserves the right to settle any claims. One could argue that, this provision favours the insured. However, a critical analysis should be able to come up with the fact that, the insured is presumed to be at loss, and therefore, the insured is favoured only after some non-compliance cases. It is clear therefore that, the provision looks at the insured as a potential loser who needs the right to seek legal redress. In the exercise of their right to sue, insurers must exercise due care and skill. Their efforts in the conduct of legal proceedings should be satisfactory, and any failure to measure up to this standard is a breach which entitles the insured to damage, if he is injured thereby.

Some contracts and statutes impose a duty on the insurer to defend suits in any proceedings falling under them. Where such is the case, insurers even when they are contesting their own liability to the insured, are well advised to come forward and defend.                                                                                                                      

Our courts45, though drawing very heavily from imported law freedom of contract is emphasized, since parties are free to contract as they please and, if their contract is not illegal or otherwise contrary to public policy, it is enforced as the parties provide.  Moreover, no court relieves a party from his contractual obligations merely because it appears that he unwillingly or in utter ignorance entered a harsh bargain, unless some legal mistake, fraud, duress, total lack of consideration or supervening impossibility can be shown.46 This provision again put the insured at stake, since he does not always have time to read the contract between lines. Moreover, some insured may lack command of the language of the contract.

In Tanzania, for instance, most insurance contracts are written in English, while only few of the nationals are sufficiently versed with the language. Courts have on several occasions strongly suggested and even enforced the suggestion that a party in a strong bargaining position who in a sense dictates all of the terms of a contract, cannot insert any conceivable provision he may wish into the Contractual provisions should measure up to a reasonableness test and when challenged is not be enforceable, if they are not reasonable.  They will be severed from the rest of the contract, which will itself remain binding and enforceable.47

However, the author fails to recognize that, policy and practical realities are different in that policy may provide, but the insurer may choose to act against. This could be the reason why the author hesitates to provide a practical case in favour of his argument.  

A better argumentation would be that policy clause may be unreasonable because its content is not relevant or is only remotely so to the substance of the contract. Such a clause was considered in the case of:  Bhimji Amand Shah v. Hercules Insurance​[19]​ co.  Ltd.48 In that case the clause required a small retail trader to keep a “..complete set of books, accounts and showing a true and accurate record of all business transactions and stock in hand...”. 

The court of appeal held that in view of the fact that the insurance was in respect of a small trader, belonging to a class of people who did not and could not reasonably have kept the required books and accounts in an insurance of this nature, the clause was “impracticable and unreasonable” and could not be relied on by the company to escape liability.49

As a logical consequence of reasonableness in content, the court of appeal held that where the requirements of a term of the policy are impossible or improbable50 or impracticable and unreasonable,51 the insured will either be totally excused from performance or will be permitted to substitute reasonable performance. 52  Sometimes insurers may use terms ambiguously in their favour against the insured. Courts need to read policy provisions in relation to the whole contract in order to establish their essential validity.  ​[20]​

In other words, the label placed on a term by the policy is not enough and its true effect must be determined with due regard to the policy as a whole. 53A proof of title clause in Life Insurance Corporation of India v Valji gave rise to some of the most positive statements on this point.54 It was argued that since satisfactory proof of title was a condition precedent to the company’s liability although the policy in question had already matured, no debt was due and no cause of action arose until the plaintiff had proved his title to the satisfaction of the defendant’s directors.  This argument was rejected by the majority of the Court of Appeal. 

The Court of Appeal of Kenya said that the power to defer payment until satisfactory proof of identity or until form of discharge is executed, is irrelevant to the cause of action, which accrued on the happening of the event satisfactory proof of identity may be a condition precedent to the act of payment, so that the insurance company can make sure that the money payable is paid to the person entitled, it does not affect the right of that person to the money.55

This neatly solves the problems created by the harshness of insurance company’s forfeiture clauses.  Further in rejecting the condition precedent terminology in after loss clauses, Sir Clement De Lestang V.P. said:-
“The provisions of the policy empowering the company to withhold payment until the assured had done certain things cannot be classified as conditions precedent to the accruing of the company's liability.  Indeed, they only come into play after liability has been established”.56
​[21]​
The learned Vice-President concluded that proof of title clauses “...are mere formalities concerning the handing over of the money which should be ignored in ascertaining the date when payment was due...”.57  Freedom of contract does not mean that courts should not interpret contracts and give them effective forces.  Like the freedom to legislate reposed in parliament which must be constitutionally and reasonably exercised, the exercise of freedom of contract must be within the law and reasonableness is the right and freedom to contract not really legislative. 

The legislation coming out of it will bind the parties to the contract; but it will have to be interpreted and enforced by the courts in the same way as any public legislation. In some cases, the insured or any party to the contract may refer controversial issues to an arbitrator

            
Arbitration clauses58  fall into three identifiable categories.  They may call for arbitration only when the amount recoverable is disputed, they may relate to liability disputes or may call for arbitration of all differences relating to the policy.  Most of them provide that arbitration is a condition precedent to the liability of the company or more properly to suit.

In the case of Shah v. South British Insurance Co, 59 the arbitration clause read:-
If any difference arises as to the amount of any loss or damage such difference shall independently of all other questions be referred to the decision of an arbitrator.
The clause made the arbitrator's award a condition precedent ‘...to any right of action or suit...’ The company rejected the insured's claim, arguing that the loss had not been caused by the insured event. When the insured filed suit the company took preliminary objection based on the arbitration clause.  

New bold, J.A. in the Court of Appeal explained:
It is clear that a dispute relating to liability does not automatically include a dispute relating to amount.  The clause makes it requisite that the dispute on amount must arise before the bringing of the suit, through the fact that such a dispute had not arisen before the bringing of the suit would not preclude it arising thereafter for determination in the suit. The court held that the company's denial of liability ousted the arbitration clause as to amount.  It would be nonsense to ask an insured to go to arbitration to obtain an award as to amount, where it is obvious that the insurer intends to reject the whole claim. An insurer who is denying liability could probably force an insured to go to arbitration as to the amount, if the amount were made an issue before the bringing of the suit. ​[22]​

Differences as to amount arising after the filling of the suit would be settled by the court.60 In the following year, the Court of Appeal improved on their reasoning.  They seem to have agreed that in any case an amount of any loss or damage arbitration clause such as the one in the Bhimji Amand Shah case must read as:
“Limited to a live, concrete and effective dispute which is capable of resulting in an arbitrator's award of the amount of loss, which as an award, would be enforceable in a court of law.  There is no effective dispute as to the amount of loss if there is a dispute as to liability, since determination of liability must precede determination of the amount of loss.  A hypothetical award is not an award at all and cannot be enforced”.

Court's agreed with the argument of the counsel of the appellant that:- 
“The obtaining of the arbitrator's award as to the amount of loss was not a condition precedent to the action.  If it was not a condition precedent, the absence of an award could not be an absolute defence to the action”.

The rule then is that where the insurer denies liability, the insured is not bound by the clause calling for the arbitration of differences on amount only. On the other hand, liability clauses call for arbitration when anything touching on liability is in issue.  When differences arise as to whether the loss was caused by the insured or the insured was in breach or as to amount, the parties would first have to go to arbitration.  Even here, however the arbitration clause may be ousted


 The Court of Appeal held in Heyman v. Darwins Ltd61. as follows:-  ​[23]​
Where the contract itself is repudiated, in the sense that its original existence or its binding force is challenged, the parties are not bound by contract and escape the obligation to perform any of its terms including the arbitration clause, unless the provisions of the clause are wide enough to include the question of jurisdiction.  Where, however, the existence of the contract is acknowledged but one of its terms is relied on as disentitling the claimant to recover the arbitration clause is effective. 
In the case of Hercules Insurance Co. Ltd V. Trivedi & Co. Ltd, 62 the court held that there is no need to arbitrate when the dispute is as to the existence of the contract. A liability arbitration clause is only ousted when the whole existence of an insurance contract is challenged.  

Since this challenge would be based on the theory that there was no contract in the first place, the existence of the arbitration clause would equally be denied.  The aggrieved party would therefore be permitted to take the issue of the existence of the contract to court.

When one of the parties brings a suit without complying with an arbitration clause which is a condition precedent to the commencement of any action, the other party may either set up the arbitration clause as a complete defence or waive it and apply for a stay of the proceedings pending reference under the Arbitration Act.63​[24]​

Application for stay must be made “...at any time after appearance and before filing a written statement or taking any other steps in proceedings...”.64 The court has to be satisfied that, “there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the submission and that the applicant was at the time when the proceedings were commenced and still remains ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of arbitration”, before it can exercise its discretion to stay.65

Many policies have a provision such as the one which was considered in Sirdaw,66 in case either party shall refuse or fail to appoint an arbitrator within two calendar months after receipt of notice in writing requiring an appointment, the other party shall be at liberty to appoint a sole arbitrator. 

Where a policy has such a provision and one of the parties refuses to appoint an arbitrator, the other party may proceed to appoint one.  An award by sole arbitrator so appointed will be binding on both parties according to the terms of the arbitration clause and where the terms are that “It shall be final and binding” the party who refused to appoint an arbitrator will be bound.67 Arbitration awards may however be attacked on the ground of the arbitrator’s misconduct. ​[25]​

4.4.7 The Principle of Indemnity and Claims Settlement
It has been advanced that, contracts of insurance are distinguishable from those of wager or gambling in that only where one stands to suffer loss that he can be allowed to insure. This is opposed to loss of stakes as would normally be in case of wager or gambling, if the event were to turn out one way or the other. The principle of indemnity ensures that the insured can only recover an amount which is equal to his actual loss, no more no less. Accordingly, profit making on the part of insured has never been considered as forming part of this principle.68 It is submitted that, if this were not the case, many people would be driven into or tempted in killing others or deliberately setting fire to or exposing their properties to thieves so that they call  upon insurers to pay them hefty compensations, as indeed was the case of Osman Abdul Gunny v. Smith Mackenzie et al.69 In this case, Osman insured his two wives. Then he intentionally killed them and thereafter staged accidents at Lukumbulu on Njombe - Songea road. The main aim of Osman was to be paid hefty compensation from the insurer, which he failed after the court discovered that, it was a planned accident. ​[26]​

In the famous case of Bromley's Adm v.Washington Life Insurance Co.70 On the final hearing, the court dismissed the petition of the administrator and he appealed. On appeal, the proof shows clearly that, Bates had no insurable interest assignment on the policies dated March 25, 1901. The proof was clear, that Bromley took out the policies for the purpose of assigning them to Bates under the arrangement that Bates was to pay him $ 75 for them and pay the premiums. In other words, the arrangement was simply that Bromley was to get $75 for having his life insured for Bates’s benefit. 

 It is conceded, that the policies under this arrangement had been void, as the insured had no insurable interest in the life of Bromley. But it is insisted that as they were made payable to Bromley's estate and were assigned by him to Bates, only the assignment is void and that his administrator may recover from the insurance company.
There would be force in this, if the policies had been delivered to Bromley and the assignment to Bates had been a subsequent and independent transaction. But the proof leaves no doubt that Bromley did not contemplate insuring his life for the benefit of his estate at any time.

The court held that, “To hold such an arrangement good would be to shut our eyes to the truth and to enforce a mere form. The law does not allow one who had no insurable interest in the life of another, to insure it for his benefit for the reason that it is a mere wager and holds out a temptation to fraud, the person having no interest in the life of the assured and having a direct interest in his death.”

4.4.8 The Principle of Contribution 
This principle demands that, where a person under-insures or over-insures property,  he would be entitled to claim only part of the loss so much as is proportional to the true value compared to the insured value.71 However, in some cases, even persons with limited interests may sometimes be permitted to insure for the whole value of the property so that their limited interests may be more adequately protected. Where this is permitted and several people interested in a property, all individually insure for the whole value individual indemnity for loss to the property would give them collectively a lot more than the actual loss to the property. ​[27]​

Even where every interested party has insured only his limited interest, it may often 
be the case that, the total realization on the insurances is a windfall both collectively and individually. Marine insurance sets out quite early to solve this problem, but only in the limited extent of over-insurance by double insurance. The English Marine Insurance Act now sets the rule out as S.80 Right to contribution
        
4.4.9	Salvage of the Wreck
This pertains to partial damage, that sometimes the insured property may not be totally destroyed. In this case, the insurer would be entitled to deduct an amount equal to the value left after loss or damage from whatever sums due to the insured, in case the latter were to elect to retain the wreck. This is again founded on the principle of indemnity.

 Ordinarily, however, the insured is not bound to accept or retain the wreck after the risk attaching. He is at liberty to apply for its retention or abandon it. The question of deduction of the estimated value of the wreck will only arise where he decides to retain the property. If he chooses to do so the first priority will go to him before the property is offered to other people.  ​[28]​                                              

4.4.10 Subrogation
Under this principle, the insurer who makes good the loss or damage caused to the insured is entitled to succeed to all the insured’s rights.72 These rights may include those founded in tort or arising from contracts to which the insured is a party. In case the insured fails or deliberately decides to sit on them, the insurer can enforce them as against third parties (persons who have wronged the insured thereby leading to the risk to attach. Naturally, where the insured himself enforces his rights and is compensated accordingly, the insured would be bound to hand over to insurer whatever sums received by him or the insurer would be entitled to deduct it from the compensation due to the insured. 

This is again done in order not to disturb the principle of indemnity. On the other hand, the right of the insurer to subrogation arises only after the insurer has complied with the contractual duty or obligation under the contract of insurance. Short of this the insurer would have no right to succeed to the insured’s rights, even if he (insured) were to receive compensation which far exceeded the actual loss suffered by him because of the risk attaching. On the principle of indemnity, the Insurance Act, 1996 states that except in the case of life assurance policies,  no sum shall be recovered or received from an insurer which exceeds the amount of value of the interest of the insured in the life or lives or other event or events, insured by the insurance or insurances. Where a person making a claim under insurance or insurance policies with intent to recover from the insurer or insurers a sum greater than that permitted in subsection (2) of section 108 of the Insurance Act 1996, he commits an act of fraud or intended fraud and that offence shall be punishable in accordance with criminal laws of Tanzania.  

Therefore, all policies promise to indemnify the insured at maturity. That it is a duty of Insurer to indemnify policies, which mature by the occurrence of the insured event. 
The duty to indemnify is subject to the insured’s observance of the terms of the policy. Since the insurance company‘s liability arises on attaching of the risk or at maturity, the company should settle the insured’s claim immediately thereafter. Failure to do so constitute a breach of contract and the insured will be entitled to damages arising from the company’s wrongful with-holding of his indemnity. Settlement will be determined in monetary value and in many cases money will be paid. The principle has been provided in the Insurance Act.73 

However, the company may elect to repair or re-instate if it has reserved for itself this right under the contract. Where it so elects to do the re-instatement or repair insured will be the agents of the company and it will be liable for their defaults.74  The repair or re-instalment should restore the damaged thing to its condition before the loss.​[29]​

4.4.11 Insured’s Clauses
Normally, there are conditions which the insured must fulfill after loss. These are quite often equated and consequently confused with warranties. On the one hand, warranties relate to the insured event in the sense of materially increasing the risk of loss when broken and their breach may actually occasion the loss. On the other hand, after-loss clauses are intended to help the insurer and probably the insured better compute the loss actually sustained. While warranties are intended to minimize the risk of loss, after - loss clauses are intended to help the insurer and the insured determine the proper indemnity and, if possible, to minimize it. In proper cases, when the insurer cancels the contract because the insured has broken a warranty, he would do so because the nature of the risk would be materially changed and probably especially where the breach has actually occasioned loss the value of damages he would be entitled to would equal the whole sum due in indemnity. Even if a more lenient view were taken of the stringency of the strict warranty rule, it is still clear that only warranties should be liability clauses, not however after-loss clauses which are properly forfeiture clauses. The insured is penalised in the whole amount of his indemnity that is already due because he has not given due notice of loss, proof of loss and so on. No regard is given to the fact such failure or even refusal may not have occasioned any damage to the insurer.

A more legal distinction is that while breach of after - loss clauses will at the very most preclude recovery in respect of that claim for which they became operative, they do not avoid the rest of the policy nor terminate cover, if it is still in force. Breach of warranties, on the other hand, exposes cover to termination and although it does not have retroactive force in respect of liability which became due before the breach, it does terminate the contract to the extent of the determination of future cover. Also, breach of warranty which extinguishes cover does not oust the operation of after - loss clauses in respect of outstanding claims. 

 4.4.12 Notice of Loss
Policy provisions will invariably require the insured to give notice of loss as soon as 
possible. Courts would usually interpret them to mean ‘within reasonable time’ which becomes a question of fact.  In each case notice of loss is often required to contain full particulars, which means detailed circumstances surrounding the loss. The rule of interpretation of after-loss clauses is that, if they are not strictly complied with, the insurer will not be liable, since they are conditions precedent to recovery. Moreover, in the case of notice of loss, the argument is advanced that if the insurer were given immediate notice it might be able to mitigate the loss. 

The argument is fallacious, however, because it erroneously suggests that insured usually act in fraudulent manner and ignore the good faith principle which requires insured to behave during the insurance with the diligence of one who is self insured.
Furthermore, it is wrongfully assumes that insurers have the facilities to prevent further loss, which are not available to the insured. Moreover, insurers are not always ready and willing to come to the aid of the insured as soon as they are aware of loss. Finally, many losses are total so that nothing could be conceivably saved after they have occurred. No rigid rule for after loss clauses is workable. Flexibility of approach depending on the facts of the individual cases seems more         satisfactory.

The absurdity of the rigid rule led to the view that whether the notice requirement will be given rigid enforcement or not will depend on the emphasis placed on it by the contract. Insurers, however, make the contract and they provide that the notice requirement is a condition precedent to their liability.  The rigid notice rule, even if it were arrived at by the interpretation of the contract, is unreasonable.
4.4.13 Proof of Loss and Title
After the notice of loss, the insured must file a claim. Insurance companies provide claim forms, and they require the insured to give his name, particulars about himself and the insured property, the circumstances of the loss, particulars of damage or loss and any other related information available to him. In insurances on lives the insured or his beneficiary will usually be required to file, with the claim, proof of title to the policy. Satisfactory compliance with these requirements is a condition precedent to the liability of the company to indemnify the insured. The same problems posed by respect of notice of loss clauses apply here. 

4.4.14 Cooperation and Assistance
In the policy, the insured will be required to promise that, in case of loss he will co-operate with and assist the company in the prosecution of legal proceedings and such co-operation and assistance is made a condition precedent to the company’s liability. The insured may violate the co-operation clause, if he makes any admissions, compromises or settlements in respect of a suit connected with an insurance claim

However, there is sometimes a strong case for saying that the company should be permitted to walk out of its obligation, if the insured fails to co-operate. This assumes that the company will always be honest as to admit the cooperation of the insured. One sees evidently that, it is the insurer who determines the level of the insured’ cooperation. It means then that, the insured is a passive participant in this consideration. For- example that, it is the insurer who has to concede that the insured has satisfied conditions and thus deserve payments. Similarly, even in cases where the law may seem to favour the insured on the surface, the fact remains that indeed, this favour can only be interpreted as presuming that the insured is at the disadvantage. What is more, the law comes in after the insured has suffered already. Here one sees that the legal clauses that seem to come to the rescue of the insured are primarily reactive while those safeguarding insurers are proactive in nature. It is on this basis that the conclusion based on this chapter holds that, laws relating to insurance claims and claims settlement favour the insurers more than the insured.    
  
 4.4.15 Conclusion 
Chapter Four has particularly revolved around the main thrust of this study that investigated legal and practical problems associated with insurance claims and claims settlement in Tanzania. The chapter has begun by focusing on the profiles of the three insurance companies involved in the investigation. It has been evident that the three insurance companies cover different insurance policies. In each of the insurance companies instances of outstanding insurance claims and repudiated cases have been apparent. It has been learnt further that, the instances are closely related with insurance laws and policies that work in the interest of insurers by failing to have in place effective mechanisms that could force compliance by insurers.

















5.0 CONCLUSION AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction
This chapter concludes the study and puts forward some recommendations based on the findings and discussions presented in the preceding chapters. The aim is to relate the findings to the main hypothesis that guided this investigation. The conclusion comprises a brief summation of the findings and arguments relating to the whether the findings support the hypothesis or not. We begin with conclusion.    

5.2 Conclusion 
This work has examined legal and practical problems relating to insurance claims and claims settlement in Tanzania. The major assumption was that the laws relating to insurance claims and claims settlement favour insurers more than the insured. In order to confirm or reject the hypothesis, the researcher had to review relevant literatures, conducted field research to insurance companies’ officials (insurers) and some insurance customers (the insured) and review related documents including company policies, claims and claims settlement documentation and laws relating to the subject at hand. 

Literature relating to the origin and development of insurance business showed that the business developed and grew in the periods characterized by exploitative modes of production that extended from slavery through feudal to capitalist relations. Since the main target was capital accumulation, it followed that laws relating to claims and claim settlement had to work in the best interest of insurers, who were also related to the ruling clique.  It has been evident also that, the insurance business could not change its face, even with the evolution of modern business and competitive economy. For example, even after Tanzania adopted the policy of socialism and self-reliance, the sole insurance monopoly, the NIC still had its central role as capital accumulation. It is on this basis that in the present investigation, the NIC has been at a lead in terms of outstanding claims, especially with reference to life insurance. 

It has also been established that, laws relating to insurance claims and claims settlement make sure that, the insured contribute to insurance companies as long as possible before they can demand premiums. To enforce this, the laws tend to predict possible interferences, including exemption of chronic and incurable diseases and those with advance ages. In the discussion with FGD respondents, it was claimed that, if the laws had to consider the interests of the insured, people with health problems and old ones could be seen as the most needy.  

Similarly, it has been found that, laws relating to insurance claims and claims settlement tend to impose conditions and punishment to the insured upon different insurance breaches, only to remain silent on the part of insurers. For instance, while the laws specify penalties and imprisonment of non-complying insured, they only declare insurers as guilty without saying what measures out to be staged against them. 

It has also been found that, although the laws may specify the time within which insurers should settle claims in favour of the insured, the same laws give loopholes to insurers to avoid the responsibilities by applying to the commissioner. For instance, some ten (10) respondents in the FGD had not paid their life insurance claims by the NIC for more than ten days after maturity and subsequent claims. This evidently gives insurers an upper hand at the expense of the insured.

The laws also impose a lot of conditions that the insured should satisfy as they claim their insurance premiums. For instance, there are time limits to report incidences, associated with a lot of documents which, in most cases were not demanded when applying for insurance coverage. The most controversial issue has been the ‘after loss clause’ that demands that, the insured report the incidence as soon as possible, as it has been found to have a lot of disadvantages to the insured. 

To be brief, in the present investigation, no single provision has been found to unconditionally work in favour of the insured; rather, the laws tend to impose a lot of conditions precedent to insurance claims settlement. Even where insurers are bound to act in favour of the insured, the same laws provide exemptions and referrals. It is on these grounds that it is concluded that the findings of this study have confirmed the guiding hypothesis of this study, that ‘the insurance laws relating to insurance claims and claims settlement favour insurers more than the insured’. 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
5.3.1. Recommendations for Implementation  
Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations for implementation have been made: 
First, insurance companies should fulfill their obligations even where insurance laws offer loopholes for avoidance and irresponsibility.  In the present economic climate characterized by trade liberalization and competition, insurance companies cannot avoid this recommendation, if they should survive. In short, only the insurance companies that heed this recommendation can attract more customers and thus increase their competitive edges. 

Secondly, there is a need for different stakeholders, including the government, Non-government organizations, politicians and human rights activists to put pressure to see that exploitative insurance laws and provisions are amended and repealed. It must be recalled that, insurance has been nurtured in the exploitative contexts, namely slavery, feudalism and capitalism. For this case, it is not difficult to see that insurance laws suffer from the business historical legacy.

5.3.2 Recommendations for Further Study
The Following Recommendations For Further Study Have Been Made 
First, a study should be conducted to determine whether insurance companies operate in the lines that they are required to by law. This should basically include review of the policy and requirements for registration of insurance companies. 
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